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Abstract
We study repeated games with pure strategies and stochastic discounting
under perfect information, with the requirement that the stage game has at
least one pure Nash action profile. Players discount future payoffs with a com-
mon, but stochastic, discount factor where associated stochastic discounting
processes are required to satisfy Markov property, martingale property, hav-
ing bounded increments, and possessing state spaces with rich ergodic subsets.
We, additionally, demand that there are states resulting in discount factors
arbitrarily close to 0, and that they are reachable with positive (yet, possibly
arbitrarily small) probability in the long run. In this setting, we prove both the
perfect Folk Theorem and our main result: The occurrence of any finite num-
ber of consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile, must almost
surely happen within a finite time window no matter which subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy is considered and no matter how high the initial discount
factor is.
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1 Introduction
The Folk Theorems of Aumann and Shapley (1994) and Fudenberg and Maskin (1986)
establish that payoffs which can be approximated in equilibrium with patient players,
are equal to the set of individually rational ones. The main reason for this observa-
tion is players’ ability to coordinate their actions using past behavior. In turn, this
vast multiplicity of equilibrium payoffs, considerably weakens the predictive power of
game theoretic analysis. Moreover, the consideration of limited memory and bounded
rationality, lack of perfect observability of the other players’ behavior and the past,
and uncertainty of future payoffs do not change this conclusion.1 An important aspect
of all these findings is the use of constant discounting.2 On the other hand, allowing
for the discount factor to depend on the history of the game and/or vary across time,
is not extensively analyzed in the literature on repeated games.3
The current paper studies repeated games with pure strategies and common
stochastic discounting under perfect information with the requirement that the stage
game is any finite normal form game possessing at least one pure Nash action pro-
file. Players are assumed to discount future payoffs with a common, but stochastic,
discount factor. Each player observes the current one–shot discount factor before
making a choice of action in that period. Moreover, the associated stochastic dis-
counting processes are required to satisfy the following: (1) Markov property; (2)
1These observations are documented in various studies including Kalai and Stanford (1988),
Sabourian (1998), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2007);
Fudenberg, Levine, and Maskin (1994), Ho¨rner and Olszewski (2006), Mailath and Olszewski (2011);
Dutta (1995), Fudenberg and Yamamato (2010), and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2009).
2An accepted interpretation of the use of discounting in repeated games, offered by Rubinstein
(1982) and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), is that the discount factor determines the probability
of the strategic interaction surviving into the next period. Thus, constant discounting implies that
this probability is independent of the history of the game, in particular, invariant.
3There is a vast body of related work concerning stochastic interest rates that can be found in
the theory of finance. To that regard, we refer the reader to Ross (1976), Harrison and Kreps (1979),
and Hansen and Richard (1987).
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martingale property; (3) have bounded increments (across time) and possess state
spaces with rich ergodic subsets; (4) there are states of the stochastic discounting
process that are arbitrarily close to 0, and such states can be reached with positive
(yet, possibly arbitrarily small) probability in the long run.
In this setting, we, not only establish the subgame perfect Folk Theorem, but also
prove the main result of this study, the inevitability of Nash behavior : The occurrence
of any finite number of consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile, must
almost surely happen within a finite time window no matter which subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy is considered and no matter how high the initial level of the
stochastic discounting process is. In other words, for all levels of the initial one–
shot discount factor every equilibrium strategy profile must almost surely involve a
stage, i.e. each stochastic process governing the one–shot discount factors possesses
a stopping time, after which long consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action
profile must be observed.4
The fundamental reason of our main result is captured by a significant phrase
to be found on page 101 of Williams (1991): “Whatever always stands a reasonable
chance of happening, will almost surely happen – sooner rather than later.” Indeed,
we prove that for any ε > 0 and for any given initial level of the stochastic discounting
process, the one–shot discount factor must almost surely fall below ε in a finite time
period. Then, given any natural number K, the restriction of bounded increments
enables us to identify the desired level of ε so that the one–shot discount factors
cannot exceed a certain threshold even when K + 1 consecutive “good” shocks are
realized.
It needs to be emphasized that the inevitability of Nash behavior, an event that
4Considering the repeated prisoners’ dilemma with stochastic discounting, our results display
that: (1) the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds; and, (2) in any subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy for any natural number K, the occurrence of K consecutive defection action profiles must
happen almost surely within a finite time period, regardless of the initial level of the stochastic
one–shot discount factor.
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almost surely happens in some distant future, should not be interpreted as an “Anti–
Folk Theorem”. In fact, the punchline of this study is that both of the inevitability
of Nash behavior and the subgame perfect Folk Theorem results hold in a wide class
of repeated games with stochastic discounting. This, in turn, establishes the fol-
lowing observation: When the initial level of the stochastic discounting process is
high enough, the inevitability result does not have a sufficiently strong impact on the
state contingent and time consistent plans of actions drafted and evaluated with the
information available at date zero.
In order to explain why the subgame perfect Folk Theorem holds in this environ-
ment, first, it needs to be pointed out that our requirements on stochastic discounting
processes imply the evaluation of payoffs in repeated games with constant discount-
ing being closely related to that with stochastic discounting. Given any repeated
game under perfect information and a constant discount factor δˆ ∈ (0, 1), a repeated
game under perfect information and stochastic discounting with the initial level of
the stochastic one–shot discount factor equalling δˆ, can be interpreted as a perturba-
tion of the original game, and it exhibits the following properties: (1) The date zero
expectations of the stochastic one–shot discount factors are all equal to δˆ; and (2)
with date zero expectations, players employ weaker discounting than that associated
with a constant and common discount factor δˆ; and (3) at any history, expected level
of future one–shot discount factors are equal to the current one.
Using this observation, we prove that given any history of shocks, players evaluate
future payoffs of a given strategy profile with expectations of future one–shot discount
factors, where these expectations are formed with information given by the history of
shocks. That is, we prove that the conclusions of Abreu (1988) and Abreu, Pearce, and
Stachetti (1990) apply: Given any time period t and any history of shocks up to period
t, the set of subgame perfect continuation payoffs is compact. Thus, when checking
whether or not a given strategy profile is subgame perfect, the following suffices: For
any period t and any history of shocks and actions up to t, the continuation utility of
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every player must exceed the one given by a player deviating singly (from the action
profile prescribed by the strategy for that particular history) followed by him being
punished in the most severe and credible manner for the rest of the game. It needs
to be emphasized that, the specific form of a player’s punishment, triggered by him
deviating singly in period t, also depends on the particular realizations of the one–
shot discount factors in period t+1. This is because, we require the punishment to be
subgame perfect, thus, optimal in the subgame that starts in period t+1 where players
observe the current level of the one–shot discount factor before choosing actions.
Having established that the check for subgame perfection reduces to the com-
parison of the continuation payoffs obtained by conforming with those delivered by
deviation followed by punishment, for any player and for any history of actions and
shocks, we identify a class of strategies with which this task becomes manageable.
Indeed, this kind of strategies also help in the construction of an analogy between
repeated games with stochastic discounting and those with constant discounting. We
concentrate on strictly enforceable strategies in repeated games with constant dis-
counting:5 Those, for which the incentive inequalities hold strictly with a strictly
positive slack independent from the identity of the player and the date. Clearly, such
strategies are subgame perfect in the repeated game with constant discounting. Then,
for a given strictly enforceable strategy in a repeated game with constant discounting
δˆ, we construct an extension of it in the repeated game with stochastic discounting
with the initial level given by δˆ, as follows: It prescribes the play to continue as dic-
tated by its counterpart in the repeated game with constant discounting, whenever
each of the past realizations of the one–shot discount factors exceeds a date and state
specific threshold. Otherwise, our strategy recommends the play to consist of the
repetitions of a Nash action profile of the stage game thereafter. Then, we show that,
when the initial level of the stochastic discounting process, δˆ, is sufficiently high, we
5This notion is first used in Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), and is closely related to
patient strictness of Mailath and Olszewski (2011).
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can construct date and state specific thresholds such that, given a date and state,
the probability (evaluated in that date and state) of the one–shot discount factor
of the next period falling below its associated threshold, is sufficiently low. This, in
turn, implies that when the initial level of the stochastic discounting process is chosen
sufficiently high, our extension –of the strictly enforceable strategy in the repeated
game with constant discounting– is subgame perfect. Meanwhile, because that δˆ is
sufficiently high, the associated date–zero utility profile of the extension is arbitrarily
close to that of its counterpart in the repeated game with constant discounting.
Finally, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem for repeated games with stochastic
discounting is obtained by combining the above construction and the observation
that when restricted to pure actions, the strategy profile in the proof of the subgame
perfect Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) is, in fact, strictly enforceable.
The literature on stochastic discounting in repeated games is surprisingly not
rich. A significant contribution is Baye and Jansen (1996). This study considers a
form of stochastic discounting with no stringent restrictions on the values that one–
shot discount factors can take, and the distributions of one–shot discount factors may
depend on the time index. However, in contrast to ours, their setting does not involve
history dependent stochastic discounting. Moreover, they identify two significant
cases: The first, when the one–shot discount factor is realized before the actions in
the stage game are undertaken; the second, when the actions need to be chosen before
the one–shot discount factor is realized. They prove that the Folk Theorem holds
with in the latter case. However, they show that in the former case the “full” Folk
Theorem “...breaks down; payoffs on the boundary of the set of individually rational
payoffs are unobtainable as Nash equilibrium average payoffs to the supergame.” In
fact, our formulation, at first sight, seems to correspond to their second case because
our setting involves the one–shot discount factor being common knowledge before
actions are chosen. Consequently, our “full” Folk Theorem may appear to be at
odds with their findings. However, there is a critical difference which concerns the
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beginning of the game. In our model, the initial level of the one–shot discount factor is
deterministic and common knowledge. Indeed, the failure of the “full” Folk Theorem
shown in the second setting of Baye and Jansen (1996) is primarily due to the action
profile chosen in date–zero being a function of the random period–zero discount factor
observed by players before the date–zero action is chosen.
There is a number of notable contributions in the context of Folk Theorems in
stochastic games. Indeed, recent significant studies by Fudenberg and Yamamato
(2010) and Ho¨rner, Sugaya, Takahashi, and Vieille (2009) generalize the Folk Theorem
of Dutta (1995) for irreducible stochastic games with the requirement of a finite state
space. In fact, our setup can be expressed as an irreducible stochastic game where
discounting is constant, yet the stochastic stage game payoffs are obtained using a
single stochastic scalar, and the actions chosen have no bearing on future payoffs.
Indeed, even though the punchline of our study is not just the Folk Theorem, it
needs to be mentioned that the repeated games with stochastic discounting that the
current study concentrates on, are particular irreducible stochastic games, however,
with infinite state spaces. Hence, none of these significant Folk Theorems apply.
The organization of the paper is as follows: The next section will present the
preliminaries. In section 3, we characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium
payoffs. In section 4, we present and prove the main theorem of this study. Finally,
in section 5, the subgame perfect Folk Theorem for repeated games with stochastic
discounting is stated and proven.
2 Preliminaries
Let G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N) be a normal form game with |N | ∈ N and for all i ∈ N , Ai
is player i’s actions with property that |Ai| ∈ N; and i’s payoff function denoted by
ui : A→ R where A =
∏
i∈N Ai and A−i =
∏
j 6=iAi.
For what follows, we assume that the stage game, G, has a pure strategy Nash
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equilibrium:
Assumption 1 G = (N, (Ai, ui)i∈N) is such that there exists a∗ ∈ A with the prop-
erty that for all i ∈ N , ui(a∗) ≥ ui(ai, a∗−i) for all ai ∈ Ai.
For any i ∈ N denote the (pure strategy) minmax payoff and a (pure strategy)
minmax profile for player i by vi = mina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i) and the associated
action profile by mi ∈ argmina−i∈A−i maxai∈Ai ui(ai, a−i), respectively. The set of
individually rational payoffs is denoted by U = {u ∈ co (u(A)) : ui ≥ vi for all i ∈ N},
and the set of strictly individually rational payoffs by U0 = {u ∈ co(u(A) : ui >
vi for all i ∈ N}.
The supergame of G consists of an infinite sequence of repetitions of G taking
place in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . . Let N0 = N ∪ {0}.
In every period t ∈ N0, a random variable, dt, is determined, forming a stochastic
process {dt}t∈N0 . The following summarizes the assumptions needed, which allows
for a wide class of stochastic processes:
Assumption 2 {dt}t∈N0 is a stochastic process satisfying the following:
1. Markov property;
2. martingale property;
3. the state space Ω of {dt}t, is a subset of (0, 1);
4. given Ω, the set of ergodic states, ΩE, is dense in Ω;
5. for any ε > 0, there exists τ ≥ t with Pr [dτ < ε | Ft] > 0;
6. for any given state ω ∈ Ω ⊆ (0, 1), the set of states ω′ ∈ Ω that are reachable
from ω in a single period and satisfying ω < ω′, denoted by R(ω), is finite.
Moreover, for any ω, ω′ ∈ Ω with ω′ ≥ ω, supR(ω′) ≥ supR(ω);
7. d0 is non-stochastic.
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The first two parts of Assumption 2 imply that expectations about the future
depend only on the current value of the stochastic process, and are equal to the
current value. The third and fourth parts of Assumption 2 imply that the set of
values reachable is (0, 1), and the set of aperiodic and non-transient states must be
dense in the state space. In the fifth part of Assumption 2, we require that there are
states arbitrarily close to 0, and such states can be reached with positive, but possibly
arbitrarily small, probability in the long run. It is essential to note that when the
state space of the stochastic process is finite, then the fifth part of our assumption
cannot hold. The sixth part of Assumption 2 requires that the “upward jumps” in the
process cannot involve infinitely many states. Indeed, it can be viewed as a special
form of the standard bounded increments requirement, which is satisfied due to this
process being bounded. In other words, the above requirement limits the increments
to be bounded non-trivially at every state. The final part of Assumption 2 requires
that the initial level of the stochastic process is deterministic.
We wish to point out that the stochastic process known as the normalized beta-
binomial distribution with two dimensions, a Polya’s urn scheme,6 satisfies all the
requirements of Assumption 2, where the relevant state space Ω is a subset of rational
numbers in (0, 1).7 For more specifics, we refer the reader to Karlin and Taylor (1975).
6Define {dt}t as follows: Without loss of generality, let d0 = δˆ be a rational number in (0, 1).
Thence, δˆ = gg+b for some g, b ∈ N, where g is interpreted as the number of “good”, b as the “bad”,
balls in the urn. A ball is drawn randomly, and is put back into the urn along with a new ball of the
same nature, and this process is repeated in each round. Thus, the support of d1 is { g+1g+1+b , gg+1+b}
where the first observation happens with probability d0. Inductively, for any t > 1 given dt−1 (a
realization of dt−1) the support of dt equals { g+k+1g+b+t , g+kg+b+t} where k ≤ t denotes the number of
good balls drawn up to period t and the first element of this support is drawn with a probability
given by dt−1.
7In some sources, the Polya scheme is defined directly by the rational number obtained from the
ratio (of the number of good balls over the number of total balls). Such definitions do not distinguish
between having 1 good ball among 2 and having 50 good balls among 100. Consequently, the Markov
property does not hold when such a definition is employed. On the other hand, the same stochastic
9
Given a stochastic process {dt}t∈N0 , let {Ft}t∈N0 be a filtration (i.e. sequence of
growing σ-algebras); and, for any given t ∈ N0, Ft is commonly interpreted as the
information in period t.
Given τ , we let a particular realization of the stochastic process {dt}t∈N0 be de-
noted by dτ ∈ R.
The supergame is defined for a given {dt}t with δˆ = rd0 and r ∈ (0, 1], and is
denoted by G({dt}t).8 For k ≥ 1, a k−stage history is a k-length sequence hk =
((a0, d1), . . . , (ak−1, dk)), where, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, at ∈ A; and for all 1 ≤ t ≤ k,
dt is realization of dt; the space of all k-length histories is Hk, i.e., Hk = (A× R)k.
We use e for the unique 0–stage history — it is a 0–length history that represents the
beginning of the supergame. The set of all histories is defined by H =
⋃∞
n=0Hn. For
every h ∈ H, we let `(h) denote the length of h. For t ≥ 2, we let dt = (d1, . . . , dt)
denote the history of shocks up to and including period t.
We assume that players have complete information. That is, in period t > 0,
knowing the history up to period t, given by ht, the players make simultaneous moves
denoted by at,i ∈ Ai. The players’ choices in the unique 0–length history e are in A
as well. Notice that in our setting, given t, a player not only observes all the previous
action profiles, but also all the shocks including the ones realized in period t. In other
words, the period–t shocks are commonly observed before making a choice in period
process can be defined by the number of good balls divided by the total number of balls, where
the information kept consists of the number of good balls and the number of total balls. Then, the
process is a Markovian martingale. To see this, observe that a stochastic process defined by the
number of good balls is clearly Markovian, and it is a martingale with respect to 1 divided by the
number of total balls.
8The reason why we have chosen to formulate δˆ ∈ (0, 1) as a multiplication of a real number r in
(0, 1] and d0 is as follows: The stochastic process at hand may involve states spaces that are strict
subsets of (0, 1). As an example consider the stochastic process given by Polya’s urn, defined in
footnote 6. Then, the state space is a subset of the rational numbers in (0, 1). Hence, for obtaining
δˆ precisely, a multiplication with a real number in (0, 1] might be necessary, when δˆ is not a rational
number.
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t.
For all i ∈ N , a strategy for player i is a function fi : H → Ai mapping histories
into actions. The set of player i’s strategies is denoted by Fi, and F =
∏
i∈N Fi is
the joint strategy space. Finally, a strategy vector is f = (f1, . . . , fn). Given an
individual strategy fi ∈ Fi and a history h ∈ H we denote the individual strategy
induced at h by fi|h. This strategy is defined point-wise on H: (fi|h)(h¯) = fi(h · h¯),
for every h¯ ∈ H. We will use (f |h) to denote (f1|h, . . . , fn|h) for every f ∈ F and
h ∈ H. We let Fi(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈ H} and F (f) = {f |h : h ∈ H}.
A strategy f ∈ F induces an outcome pi(f) as follows: pi0(f) = f(e) ∈ A; and for
d1 ∈ R we have pi1(f)(d1) = f(f(e), d1) ∈ A; and, pi2(f)(d2) = f(f(e), f(f(e), d1), d2) ∈
A, d1, d2 ∈ R; and continuing in this fashion we obtain
pik(f)(dk) = f
(
pi0(f), pi1(f)(d1), . . . , pik−1(f)(dk−1), dk
) ∈ A, k > 1 and d1, . . . , dk ∈ R.
On the other hand, the repeated game with common and constant discounting,
with a discount factor δˆ ∈ (0, 1), is denoted by G¯(δˆ). We employ the above definitions
without the parts concerning the stochastic discounting process.
Next, we wish to present the construction of expected payoffs. Due to that regard,
first we will present our stochastic discounting construction, and second formulate the
resulting expected utilities.
Players payoffs are evaluated with a common stochastic discount factor, denoted
by
{
dt+1t
}
t∈N0 , where for any given t ∈ N0, d
t+1
t identifies the probability of the game
continuing from period t to period t + 1. Hence, the stochastic discount factor from
period t to period τ , with τ ≥ t+ 1, is defined by dτt ≡ r
∏τ−1
k=t dk, for some r ∈ (0, 1]
with the convention that dtt = 1. This trivially implies that d
t+1
t = rdt. We often
denote E(dτt | Fs) by Es (dτt ), s ≤ t ≤ τ . For any t ∈ N0, we let a realization of dt+1t
be denoted by δt+1t , which stands for the realized probability that the game continues
from period t to period t + 1. In the rest of the paper, we often abuse notation and
denote E (dτt |Fs) (i.e. Es (dτt )) by E (δτt |Fs) and Es (δτt ), for s ≤ t ≤ τ .
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One thing to note is the particular timing and information setting that we employ:
Given rd0 = δˆ the stochastic discount factor determining the probability that the
game continues into the next period is pinned down to a constant, d10 = rd0 = δˆ.
In the next period, t = 1, d1 is realized before players decide on a1 ∈ A. So, the
realization of rd1 = d
2
1 is also known at t = 1. Thus, following an inductive argument
in any period t > 1, the given dt determines the particular level of δt+1t .
The following Lemma displays that the stochastic discounting process constructed
in this study involves weaker discounting than the one associated with constant dis-
counting:
Lemma 1 Suppose that Assumption 2 is satisfied. Then
1. every possible realization of dτt is in (0, 1) for every τ, t ∈ N0 with τ > t,
2. E
(
dt+1t |F0
)
= δ(0) for some δ(0) ∈ (0, 1) and for all t ∈ N0,
3. for every given δˆ ∈ (0, 1), there exists r ∈ (0, 1] such that δ(0) = δˆ,
4. for every τ, t, s ∈ N0 with τ > s ≥ t, given dt+1t = δt+1t
E
(
dτ+1τ |Ft
)
= δt+1t ,
and
E (dτs |Ft) ≥
(
E
(
ds+1s |Ft
))τ−s
=
(
δt+1t
)τ−s
. (1)
The implications of this Lemma are essential for the proof, the interpretation and
the evaluation of our results:
The first one displays that the stochastic process specified results in a well-defined
construction for stochastic discounting. This is because for every τ, t ∈ N0 with τ > t,
dτt = r
∏τ−1
k=t dk is in (0, 1) which is due to r ∈ (0, 1], and every possible realization of
dk for every k ∈ N0 being in (0, 1).
The second shows that date zero expectations of future one–period discount factors
are constant with respect to the time index.
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And the third, displays that r can be chosen so that any given constant discount
factor can be precisely obtained. In fact, we wish to point out that the reason for using
a real number r ∈ (0, 1] in the definition given by dτt ≡ r
∏τ−1
k=t dk (and not simply
letting r = 1) is that our construction does not necessarily require the stochastic
processes to have a support consisting the entirety of (0, 1). Therefore, when dealing
with stochastic processes requiring Ω 6= (0, 1), for any δˆ ∈ (0, 1) \ Ω, r ∈ (0, 1] and
ωˆ ∈ Ω can be identified such that r is sufficiently close to 1 and δˆ = rωˆ. Thus,
without loss of generality, we assume r = 1 in the rest of this study.
Using the first three results presented in the above Lemma, we conclude with
respect to date zero expectations, the repeated game at hand can be associated with
one having a constant and common discount factor. Thus, our repeated game with
stochastic discounting can be interpreted as a perturbation of a “standard” repeated
game under perfect information with common and constant discount factor.
Finally, the fourth implication of Lemma 1 is twofold: Given any history of shocks
up to time period t, the first implication is that the expected level of future one–
shot discount factors are equal to the current one. The second shows that every
player values future returns more than a player using a constant discount factor
obtained from the same shocks. That is, a player discounts a return in period τ ,
τ > t, with Et (d
τ
t ) which is greater or equal to
(
Et
(
dt+1t
))τ−t
. (Notice that given dt,
Et (d
τ
t ) = δ
t+1
t Et
(
dτt+1
)
, because dt+1t = δ
t+1
t is realized.) In particular, this implies δˆ
can be chosen so that
E0 (d
τ
t ) ≥
(
E0
(
dt+1t
))τ−t
= δˆτ−t =
(
δ(0)
)τ−t
,
and when τ = t+1 then this inequality holds with an equality. Hence, these properties
establish that with a date 0 point of view, our stochastic discounting construction in-
volves weaker discounting than that associated with a constant and common discount
factor.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proofs of parts 1, 2 and 3 of the Lemma are already
discussed above. The first part of the fourth result is, in fact, the martingale identity.
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For the second part, notice that
E (dτs |Ft) = rE
(
τ∏
k=s
dk|Ft
)
= rE (dsE (ds+1 . . .E (dτ−1|Fτ−1) . . .|Fs)|Ft)
≥ rE
(
(ds)
(τ−s)|Ft
)
≥ (E (ds+1s |Ft))τ−s = (E (δt+1t |Ft))τ−s ,
due to the tower property (see Williams (1991)), the martingale identity and Jensen’s
inequality.
The next Assumption is about how players employ knowledge of the past when
taking expectations:
Assumption 3 In every period t ∈ N0, each player uses the most up to date infor-
mation, i.e. Ft.
Given a strategy profile f , because that each period’s supremum return is bounded
for every player, the payoff of player i ∈ N in the supergame G({dt}t) of G is, where
d0 = δˆ ∈ (0, 1):
Ui(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)ui
(
pi0(f)
)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ10ui (pi1(f)(d1))|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (E (δ20ui (pi2(f)(d2))|F1)|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (E (E (δ30ui (pi3(f)(d3))|F2)|F1)|F0)+ . . . .
Because that {Fs}s=0,1,,2,... is a filtration, the above term reduces to
Ui(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)ui
(
pi0(f)
)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ10ui (pi1(f)(d1))|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ20ui (pi2(f)(d2))|F0)
+(1− δˆ)E (δ30ui (pi3(f)(d3))|F0)+ . . . ,
i.e.
Ui(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=0
E
(
δk0ui
(
pik(f)(dk)
)|F0) ,
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where pi0(f)(d0) = pi(f(e)), and recall that E (δtt|Fs) = 1 for all s ≤ t. Following
a similar method, we can also define the continuation utility of player i as follows:
Given t ∈ N and dt ∈ Rt for τ ≥ t
V τ,d
t
i (f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=τ
E
(
δkτui
(
pik(f)(dk)
)|Ft) . (2)
We use the convention that V 0,d
0
i (f, {dt}t) = Ui(f, {dt}t).
When attention is restricted to G¯(δˆ), i.e. the repeated game with constant dis-
counting, the payoffs are defined as follows: For any strategy f¯ of the repeated game
G¯(δˆ), the payoff of player i is given by U¯i(f¯ , δˆ) = (1 − δˆ)
∑∞
t=0 δˆ
tui(p¯i
t(f¯)), where
p¯i(f¯) ∈ A∞ is the outcome path of G¯(δˆ) induced by f¯ . For any p¯i ∈ A∞, t ∈ N0, and
i ∈ N , let V¯ ti (p¯i, δˆ) = (1− δˆ)
∑∞
r=t δˆ
r−tui(p¯ir) be the continuation payoff of player i at
date t if the outcome path p¯i is played.
3 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
A strategy vector f ∈ F is a Nash equilibrium ofG({dt}t) if for all i ∈ N , Ui(f, {dt}t) ≥
Ui((fˆi, f−i), {dt}t) for all fˆi ∈ Fi. A strategy vector f ∈ F is a subgame perfect equilib-
rium of the supergame G({dt}t) if every f ′ ∈ F (f) is a Nash equilibrium. We denote
the set of subgame perfect equilibrium strategies of G({dt}t) by SPE(G({dt}t)). Let
V ({dt}t) be the subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs of G({dt}t). We will abuse no-
tation and will let V ({dt}t) denoted by V(δˆ) where δˆ = d0. Moreover, V ({dt}t, τ)
are the subgame perfect equilibrium continuation payoffs (in period τ terms), when
dτ is realized. In fact, abusing notation we let V ({dt}t, τ) = V(δτ+1τ ).
Moreover, when attention is restricted to the repeated game with constant dis-
counting, G¯(δˆ), subgame perfection can easily be defined by excluding stochastic
parts of the above definitions. We denote the set of subgame perfect strategies in
G¯(δˆ) by SPE(G¯(δˆ)). Let V¯(δˆ) be the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs in
the repeated game with constant discount factor δˆ.
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Letting d0 = δˆ below we will show that for every t and d
t, V(δt+1t ) is compact,
hence, obtain the following characterization analogous to Abreu (1988): A strategy
f is subgame perfect if and only if for all i ∈ N and for all t ∈ N0 and for all dt ∈ Rt,
we have
V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t) ≥ (1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(d
t)) + δt+1t E
(
vi(d
t+1)|Ft
)
, (3)
where δt+1t = d
t+1
t (i.e. given d
t, the realization of dt+1t is equal to δ
t+1
t ), and for every
i ∈ N
vi(d
t+1) = min
{
ui : ui ∈ V(δt+2t+1)
}
.
Before the justification of these, we wish to describe the resulting construction
briefly. Notice that, when player i decides whether or not to follow the equilibrium
behavior in period t given the history of process, dt, it must be that: The player i’s
expected continuation payoff associated with the equilibrium behavior must be as high
as player i deviating singly and optimally today, and being punished tomorrow. An
important issue to notice is that, tomorrow players will observe dt+1 (thus, δ
t+2
t+1) before
deciding on their actions. Thus, players will be punishing player i, the deviator, with
the most severe and credible punishment with the information they have in period
t + 1. Thus, the punishment payoff to player i with the information that players
have in period t + 1, i.e. dt+1, is vi(d
t+1). Player i forecasts these in period t, and
hence, forms an expectation regarding his punishment payoff (starting from period
t+ 1 onwards) with the information that he has in period t, namely dt.
In order to show that for every t and dt, V(δt+1t ) is compact, we will be employing
the construction of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), and it is important to point
out that their assumptions, 1 – 5 are all satisfied in our framework: A2, A3, and A4
are trivially satisfied as the period payoffs are deterministic, and we also impose A1
and A5.
Following their construction, given dt for any W ⊂ RN and the resulting level
of δt+1t ∈ (0, 1), let g(δt+1t ) be the expected discounted continuation utility vector
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(not including today’s payoff levels and using the normalization via δˆ ∈ (0, 1))
for an arbitrary strategy profile. Furthermore, for that given level of δt+1t , con-
sider the pair, (g(δt+1t ), a) and define E(g(δ
t+1
t ), a) = δ
t+1
t
(
(1− δˆ)u(a) + g(δt+2t+1)
)
.
A pair (g(δt+1t ), a) is called admissible with respect to W , whenever E(gi(δ
t+1
t ), a) ≥
E
(
gi(δ
t+1
t ), (γi, a−i)
)
for all γi ∈ Ai and for all i ∈ N . Moreover, for each setW , define
Bd
t
(W ) as follows Bd
t
(W ) = {E(g(δt+1t ), a)|(g(δt+1t ), a) is admissible w.r.t W}. Any
set that satisfies W ⊂ Bdt(W ) is called self-generating at dt. At this point it is useful
to recall that V(δt+1t ) = {V t,dt(f, {dt}t)| f ∈ SPE(G({dt}t))}.
Notice that
g(δt+1t ) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=t+1
E
(
δkt u
(
pik(f)(dk)
)|Ft) ,
for some strategy profile f . Furthermore since, δt+1t is actually realized before the
actions are taken and the multiplicative nature of our discount factor, the above
equation becomes
g(δt+1t ) = (1− δˆ)δt+1t
[
u
(
pit+1(f)(dt)
)
+
∞∑
k=t+2
E
(
δkt u
(
pik(f)(dk)
)|Ft)]
which is equal to
g(δt+1t ) = δ
t+1
t
[
(1− δˆ)u (pit+1(f)(dt))+ g(δt+2t+1)] .
Now, it is easy to see that V(δt+1t ) is self-generating, as the pair, (g(δt+1t ), pit+1(f)(dt))
is admissible with respect to V(δt+1t ), whenever f is a subgame perfect equilibrium
strategy profile with
V t,d
t
(f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)u(at) + g(δt+1t ),
where at = pi
t(f)(dt−1). The two further points to notice is that, due to Lemma
1 of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1990), Bd
t
(W ) is compact whenever W is com-
pact, and the operator Bd
t
is monotone. Furthermore, since V(δt+1t ) is bounded
(by (1/1 − δt+1t )U), closure of V(δt+1t ), denoted by cl(V(δt+1t )) is compact. Hence,
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Bd
t
(cl(V(δt+1t ))) is compact, and due to cl(V(δt+1t )) ⊂ Bdt(cl(V(δt+1t ))) and self-
generation cl(V(δt+1t )) ⊂ V(δt+1t ). Thus, by Theorem 2 of Abreu, Pearce, and Sta-
chetti (1990), Bd
t
(V(δt+1t )) = V(δt+1t ), thus V(δt+1t ) is compact.
4 Inevitability of Nash behavior
In this section, we wish to present the main result of this study:
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Then, for every K ∈ N, for every
δˆ ∈ (0, 1), for every stochastic discounting process {dt}t with d0 = δˆ, and for every
subgame perfect strategy profile f of the repeated game with stochastic discounting;
there exists T which is almost surely in N0, and the probability of piτ (f) being a Nash
equilibrium action profile of the stage game conditional on the information available
at s, equals 1, for all s = T, . . . , T +K and for all τ = s, . . . , T +K.
The above theorem establishes that when Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 hold, then
arbitrary long (yet, finite) consecutive repetitions of the period Nash action profile
must almost surely happen in a finite time window no matter which subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy is considered and no matter how high the initial discount factor
is. That is, any equilibrium strategy almost surely entails arbitrarily long consecutive
observations of the period Nash action profile.
Showing this result involves 2 steps: The first displays that every subgame perfect
strategy must involve the prescription of the Nash behavior whenever the current
discount factor is sufficiently small. The second displays that for any given level of
the initial discount factor and any given natural number K, the stochastic process
governing the one–shot discount factors possesses a stopping time, after which the
return to some sufficiently high level of one–shot discount rates within a K–period
time window, has zero probability with the evaluation being made in any period
within that time window.
The Proof of Theorem 1. The result follows from Lemmas 2 and 3.
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Lemma 2 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, and let δˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, for every
subgame perfect strategy profile f of G({dt}) with d0 = δˆ, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such
that for all δt+1t ≤ δ, t ∈ N0, it must be such that f(dt, at) ∈ A is a Nash equilibrium
of G.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that the subgame perfect strategy f is such
that
(
maxai∈Ai ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(d
t))− ui(pit(f)(dt))
)
> 0 for some t ∈ N0 and for some
dt and for some i ∈ N . Because otherwise, the strategy is resulting in a repetition of
period Nash behavior. Then, by equation 3, for any such subgame perfect strategy f
and i and t and dt
δt+1t
(
V t+1,d
t
i − E
(
vi(d
t+1)|Ft
)) ≥ (1− δˆ)(max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, pi
t
−i(f)(d
t))− ui(pit(f)(dt))
)
.
Both the left and the right hand sides of this inequality are strictly positive. Yet,
when the prescribed action is not a Nash equilibrium of G, then the left hand side
converges to 0 when δt+1t tends to 0, but the right hand side is constant.
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold. Then, for every δ ∈ (0, 1), for every
K ∈ N, for every δˆ ∈ (0, 1), and for every stochastic discounting process {dt}t with
δˆ = d0; there exists T which is almost surely in N0 and Pr [dτ+1τ < δ | Fs] = 1, for
every s = T, . . . , T +K and τ = s, . . . , T +K.
Proof. Let δ ∈ (0, 1) and K ∈ N and δˆ ∈ (0, 1) with δˆ = d0. Let ω0 ∈ {ω ∈
ΩE : ω < δ} 6= ∅ due to part (4) and (5) of Assumption 2. Consider ω1 ∈ ΩE with
ω0 ≥ maxR(ω1), and such an ω1 exists due to part (4), (5) and (6) of Assumption
2. 9 Now, define ω2 ∈ ΩE that satisfies ω1 ≥ maxR(ω2). Inductively, for a given
ωK−1 ∈ ΩE define ωK ∈ ΩE likewise. Again notice that due to Assumption 2 such an
ωK exists.
9Recall that for any given state ω ∈ Ω ⊆ (0, 1), the set of states ω′ ∈ Ω that are reachable from
ω in a single period and satisfying ω < ω′, is denoted by R(ω).
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Following Karlin and Taylor (1975), define the following event
ζ ≡ min{τ ∈ N0 : δτ+1τ ≤ ωK}.
Then by construction, it must be that Pr [ds+k ≥ δ | Fs] = 0, for all s = ζ, . . . , ζ +K
and k = 0, . . . , K − s. Finally, due to the ergodicity of ωK , ζ is a stopping time, that
is it will almost surely happen in a finite time period, i.e. Pr [ζ <∞] = 1. Hence,
ζ is almost surely in N0 with Pr [ds+k < δ | Fs] = 1 for all s = ζ, . . . , ζ + K and
k = 0, . . . , K − s. 10
5 The Subgame Perfect Folk Theorem
In this section we prove the following subgame perfect Folk Theorem for repeated
games with stochastic discounting.
Theorem 2 Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, and either dim(U) = n or n = 2 and
U0 6= ∅. Then, for all ε > 0, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all u ∈ U0 and for
all stochastic discounting processes {dt}t∈N0 with δˆ = d0 ≥ δ, there exists a subgame
perfect strategy f of G({dt}t) such that ‖U (f, {dt}t)− u‖ < ε.
In order to establish this result, an analogy between repeated games with stochas-
tic discounting and those with constant discounting is constructed as follows: Given
any repeated game with stochastic discounting, we consider the repeated game with
a constant discount factor that equals the initial level of the stochastic discounting
process. Particularly, in the repeated game with constant discounting we concentrate
on strictly enforceable strategies, those to which players strictly prefer to conform,
in each date and state including equilibrium and punishment phases. It is useful to
remind the reader that due to the monotonicity result of Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti
(1990), Theorem 6, such strategies are strictly enforceable for higher discount factors
as well.
10Indeed, this also implies that ζ is almost surely in N0 with Eτ (dτ ) < δ, for every τ = ζ, . . . , ζ+K.
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Formulating an extension of such a strategy and requiring it to be subgame perfect
in the repeated game with stochastic discounting, turns out to be an arduous, yet
feasible (as proven in Lemma 4), endeavor whenever the initial level of the stochastic
discounting is sufficiently high.
To see the difficulties involved, consider a repeated prisoners’ dilemma, with ac-
tions Ai = {c, d} and u1(d, c) = u2(c, d) > ui(c, c) > 12(u1(c, d)+u2(c, d)) > ui(d, d) >
u1(c, d) = u2(d, c), i = 1, 2. Clearly, there exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the coopera-
tive payoff (hence, path given by ((c, c);∞)) is sustained with a strictly enforceable
strategy profile for all δ > δ. Now, consider any stochastic discounting process satis-
fying our restrictions and possessing a sufficiently high initial level, and any strategy
such that its utility (evaluated at the beginning of the game) is arbitrarily close to
(ui(c, c))i=1,2. Due to Lemma 2, for any realizations of the one–shot discount factor
that is strictly below δ, any such strategy must dictate the play of (d, d), if it were
to be subgame perfect. Thus, any subgame perfect strategy in the repeated game
with stochastic discounting sustaining the cooperative payoff must be contingent on
the realizations of the one–shot discount factors. A simple formulation is one where
this contingency is represented by a date and state independent threshold, δ∗ ≥ δ,
so that: the play continues on the cooperative path as long as every past realization
of the one–shot discount factors is above δ∗; and otherwise, the play switches to the
defection phase. Then, the verification of subgame perfection in the repeated game
with stochastic discounting calls for checking every subgame, in particular, those with
the current one–shot discount factor arbitrarily close, yet, strictly exceeding δ∗. In
such a subgame where additionally there have not been any single player deviations
in the past and all past one–shot discount factors have been above δ∗, this strategy
should call for the play of (c, c). However, it is not subgame perfect whenever the
following holds: The stochastic discounting process is one where the probability of
the next period’s one–shot discount factor being strictly less than δ∗, is high enough
such that any one of the players finds it profitable to deviate in the current period.
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Therefore, given a strictly enforceable strategy in the repeated game with con-
stant discounting, the extended strategy we employ is contingent on the stochastic
discounting process in the following manner: It will prescribe the play to continue on
the paths dictated by its counterpart in the repeated game with constant discount-
ing, whenever each of the past realizations of the one–shot discount factors exceeds
a date and state specific threshold. Otherwise, our strategy will recommend the play
to consist of the repetitions of a Nash action profile of the stage game thereafter.
The initial level of the stochastic discounting process can be chosen sufficiently high
so that we can construct date and state specific thresholds such that, given a date
and state, the probability (evaluated in that date and state) of the one–shot discount
factor in the next period falling below its associated threshold, is sufficiently low.
This and strict enforceability, in turn, imply that the relevant incentive conditions
hold for any date and state. Meanwhile, choosing the initial level of the stochastic
discounting process to be sufficiently high, also results in the utility (evaluated at the
beginning of the game) of this strategy profile in the repeated game with stochastic
discounting to be arbitrarily close to the utility of its counterpart in the game with
the constant discount factor given by that initial level.
Finally, our result is obtained by combining the above construction and the ob-
servation that when restricted to pure actions, the strategy profile in the proof of the
subgame perfect Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin (1991) is, in fact, strictly
enforceable.
The rest of this section presents the details about the proof of Theorem 2.
Suppose Assumptions 1, 2, and 3 hold. Then, for any δˆ ∈ (0, 1), consider
the repeated game with stochastic discounting G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ; and, the
repeated game with constant discounting G¯(δˆ). For any k−stage history hk =
((a0, d1), . . . , (ak−1, dk)) of G({dt}t) where for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, at ∈ A, and for
all 1 ≤ t ≤ k, dt is realization of dt, define its deterministic counterpart, a k−stage
history, in G¯(δˆ) by h¯k = (a0, . . . , ak−1).
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Following Abreu (1988), it is well known that one may restrict attention to simple
strategies in the analysis of subgame perfection in repeated games with constant
discounting: f¯ in G¯(δ), δ ∈ (0, 1) is a simple strategy profile represented by n + 1
paths (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) if f¯ specifies: (i) play p¯i(0) until some player deviates singly
from p¯i(0); (ii) for any j ∈ N , play p¯i(j) if the jth player deviates singly from p¯i(i),
i = 0, 1, . . . , n, where p¯i(i) is the ongoing previously specified path; (iii) continue with
the ongoing specified path p¯i(i), i = 0, 1, . . . , n, if no deviations occur or if two or
more players deviate simultaneously. These strategies are simple because the play
of the game is always in only (n + 1) states, namely, in state j ∈ {0, . . . , n} where
p¯i(j),t is played, for some t ∈ N0. In this case, we say that the play is in phase t of
state j. A profile (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) of n + 1 outcome paths is subgame perfect if
the simple strategy represented by it is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Moreover,
following Barlo, Carmona, and Sabourian (2009), we say that a simple strategy f¯ in
G¯(δ), δ ∈ [0, 1), is weakly enforceable if for all i ∈ N and for all j ∈ {0, 1, .., n} and
for all t ∈ N0
V¯ ti (p¯i
(j), δ) ≥ (1− δ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, p¯i
(j),t
−i ) + δV¯
t+1
i (p¯i
(i), δ),
where (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)) is the simple strategy associated with f¯ . Due to Abreu
(1988), we know that a simple strategy f¯ ∈ SPE(G¯(δ)) if and only if f¯ in G¯(δ) is
weakly enforceable. Moreover, we say that a simple strategy f¯ in G¯(δ) with associated
outcome paths (p¯i(0), p¯i(1) . . . , p¯i(n)) is strictly enforceable if for all i ∈ N and for all
j ∈ {0, 1, .., n} and for all t ∈ N0
inf
i,j,t
(
V¯ ti (p¯i
(j), δ)−
(
(1− δ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, p¯i
(j),t
−i ) + δV¯
t+1
i (p¯i
(i), δ)
))
> 0
Let f¯ be a strictly enforceable simple strategy in G¯(δ), δ ∈ (0, 1), and the profile
of outcome paths associated be (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)). Now, let us formulate an analogy
between G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ and G¯(δˆ) for δˆ ≥ δ.
Lemma 4 Suppose that Assumptions 1, 2, 3 hold, and f¯ of G¯(δ), where δ ∈ (0, 1) and
the associated outcome paths are (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)), is a strictly enforceable simple
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strategy. Then, for all η > 0 there exists δ∗ ∈ (δ, 1) such that for all δˆ > δ∗ there is
f in G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ, such that f is subgame perfect in G({dt}t) and∥∥∥U (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ < η.
Proof. Let ν∗ be defined by
ν∗ ≡ inf
i,j,t
(
V¯ ti (p¯i
(j), δ)−
(
(1− δ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, p¯i
(j),t
−i ) + δV¯
t+1
i (p¯i
(i), δ)
))
> 0,
and consider ν > 0 with ν < min{ν∗, η}. Then, there exists δν > δ and pν ∈ (0, 1)
sufficiently close to 0 such that the following conditions hold: For all i ∈ N , j ∈
N ∪ {0}, t ∈ N0∥∥δνV¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δν)− (δν((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δν) + pνV¯ t+1i (a∗, δν)))∥∥ < ν6 (4)
inf
i,j,t
[
(1− δν)ui(p¯i(j),t) + δν((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δν) + pνV¯ t+1i (a∗, δν)) (5)
− ((1− δν) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, p¯i
(j),t
−i ) + δν
(
(1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(i), δν) + pνV¯ t+1i (a∗, δν)
)]
> ν,∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
) (
ui
(
p¯it(f¯)
))− ∞∑
t=0
(δν)
t (ui (p¯it(f¯)))
∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 , (6)∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
)
(ui (a
∗))−
∞∑
t=0
(δν)
t (ui (a
∗))
∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 , (7)
Condition 4 holds trivially. On the other hand, condition 5 holds because f¯ is strict
enforceable at δ, and the monotonicity result, Theorem 6 of Abreu, Pearce, and
Stachetti (1990), implies that f¯ ∈ SPE(G¯(δ′)) for any δ′ ≥ δ. Indeed, it can easily
be verified (by using the same techniques of the proof of this result) that f¯ is also
strictly enforceable at δ′ ≥ δ. Furthermore, since pν can be selected arbitrarily close
to 0, the associated slack (the left hand side of condition 5, which converges to ν∗
when pν tends to 0) can be chosen to strictly exceed ν. Moreover, conditions 6 and 7
are due to the following: Observe that for any process satisfying Assumption 2 with
d0 = δν , the fourth part of Lemma 1 and the Sandwich Lemma directly imply that
as δν tends to 1, E (δ
τ
t |F0) tends to (δν)τ−t for all τ, t ∈ N0 with τ ≥ t. It is important
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to point out that because pν can be selected arbitrarily small, all these conditions, 4
– 7, keep holding when they are evaluated at pν and δˆ > δν and d0 = δˆ.
Furthermore, observe that since {dt}t is a non–negative bounded martingale, {et}t
defined by et ≡ (1 − dt) for all t ∈ N0 is also a non-negative, bounded martingale.
Using Doob’s Maximal Inequality (we refer the reader to Doob (1984)) 11 for this
martingale we obtain for any t < T and δ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
(1− δ¯)Pr
[
sup
t≤s≤T
(1− δs+1s ) ≥ (1− δ¯)
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ E ((1− δT+1T )|Ft)
(1− δ¯)Pr
[
inf
t≤s≤T
δs+1s ≤ δ¯
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ E ((1− δT+1T )|Ft)
Pr
[
inf
t≤s≤T
δs+1s ≤ δ¯
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ E
(
(1− δT+1T )|Ft
)
(1− δ¯) .
Moreover, since {dt}t is a martingale the right hand side of the above condition is
constant for all T ∈ N0 and t < T , i.e.
Pr
[
inf
t≤s≤T
δs+1s ≤ δ¯
∣∣∣∣Ft] ≤ 1− δt+1t1− δ¯ .
In the following we will inductively construct the set of states in which the strategy
that we will employ in the game with stochastic discounting, would prescribe the play
to continue following f¯ . Consider d0 > δν , and recall that it is deterministic. Then,
let δ¯(1) be such that δ¯(1) ≥ δν and
1− d0
1− δ¯(1)
≤ pν ,
and define
Ω ν(1) =
{
δ ∈ Ω : δ > δν and 1− δ
1− δ¯(1)
≤ pν
}
.
Now, given δ¯(t−1) and Ω ν(t−1), define δ¯(t) such that δ¯(t) ≥ δν and for any δ ∈ Ω ν(t−1),
1− δ
1− δ¯(t)
≤ pν ,
11Doob’s Maximal Inequality for nonnegative submartingales is as follows: Let {Xt}t∈N0 be a
nonnegative submartingale with a filtration {Ft}t∈N0 and ` > 0. Then for any T for any s < T ,
`Pr
[
sups≤t≤T Xt ≥ `
∣∣Fs] ≤ E (XT |Fs).
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and let
Ω ν(t) =
{
δ ∈ Ω : δ > δν and 1− δ
1− δ¯(t)
≤ pν
}
.
Notice that for any history h, with δt+1t ∈ Ω ν(t), it must be that δt+1t is not only strictly
above δν , but also, the probability of any one of the future one–shot discount factors
being less than or equal to δ¯(t) is less than or equal to pν . An important observation
is that when d0 is chosen sufficiently high, then Ω
ν
(t) 6= ∅ for all t ∈ N. This follows
from the denseness of ΩE (the ergodic set of states) in Ω following the fourth part of
Assumption 2.
The strategy we use as follows: For any history h = (h¯, dt) for some t ∈ N0 with
`(h) = `(h¯) = t
f(h) =
 f¯(h¯) if δs+1s ∈ Ω ν(s) for all s ≤ ta∗ otherwise.
In words, this strategy prescribes the continuation along the simple strategy f¯ when-
ever the history is one in which the following hold: In any period t, all realizations
of one–shot discount factors up to period t, δs+1s with s ≤ t, have been such that (1)
each one of them is strictly above δν , and (2) the probability evaluated with date s
information of any one of the future one–shot discount factors, δk+1k with k ≥ s, being
less than or equal to δ¯(s) is less than or equal to pν , s ≤ t. For all other cases, the
strategy prescribes the repetitions of the Nash action profile of the stage game. An
interesting observation about this strategy f is that it induces the play to be in only
(n+ 2) states, namely, (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n), pi∗), where pi∗,t = a∗ for all t ∈ N0.
Clearly, this strategy is well defined.
Consider any history h. Below, we will prove that when d0 = δˆ is chosen suffi-
ciently high, f is Nash in the subgame starting at h, hence, subgame perfect.
If δs+1s /∈ Ω ν(s) for some s ≤ t, f recommends the repetition of a∗ thereafter. Hence,
is clearly Nash in such subgames.
If δs+1s ∈ Ω ν(s) for all s ≤ t, f recommends the continuation of the simple strategy
given by f¯ , which is associated with (p¯i(0), p¯i(1), . . . , p¯i(n)). Then, the continuation
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utility, equation 2, can be written as follows:
V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t) = (1− δˆ)
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
pik(f)(dk)
) (
1− ρ(t)k
)
+ ui (a
∗) ρ(t)k
)
,
where d0 = δˆ and for any k ≥ t,
ρ
(t)
k = 1− Pr
[
δs+1s ∈ Ω ν(s), for all s with t ≤ s ≤ k
∣∣Ft] ≤ pν .
Notice that, given h, hence at, (pik(f)(dk)) is equal to some (p¯i(j),κ) for some j ∈ N∪{0}
and κ, whenever δs+1s ∈ Ω ν(s) for all s with t ≤ s ≤ k, an event which happens with
probability 1− ρ(t)k . That is, in such cases the play must be in some phase of p¯i(j) for
some j ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Observe that for any process satisfying Assumption 2 (specifically the Markov
property) with d0 = δˆ > δν , condition 6 directly implies (recall that the history is
such that δt+1t > δν for all t, and Et
(
δk+1k
)
= δt+1t , k ≥ t)∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
p¯ik(f¯)
))− ∞∑
k=t
(
δt+1t
)k (
ui
(
p¯ik(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 .
Similarly due to the same reasons, condition 7 implies that∥∥∥∥∥
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)
(ui (a
∗))−
∞∑
k=t
(
δt+1t
)k
(ui (a
∗))
∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 .
Conditions 6 and 7 together with the fact that δt+1t > δν bring about
ν
3
>
∥∥∥∥∥δt+1t ((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δt+1t ) + pνV¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
− δ
t+1
t
1− δˆ
(
(1− pν)
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
p¯i(j),k(f¯)
))
+ pν
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)
(ui (a
∗))
)∥∥∥∥∥ .
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Now, using condition 4 we obtain
ν
2
>
∥∥∥∥∥δt+1t ((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
− δ
t+1
t
1− δˆ
(
(1− ρ(t)t+1)
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
) (
ui
(
p¯i(j),k(f¯)
))
+ ρ
(t)
t+1
∞∑
k=t
Et
(
δkt
)
(ui (a
∗))
)∥∥∥∥∥
=
∥∥∥∥∥δt+1t ((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δt+1t ) + pν V¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
− δt+1t
(
(1− ρ(t)t+1)V t+1,d
t+1
i (f, {dt}t) + ρ(t)t+1V t+1,d
t+1
i (a
∗, {dt}t)
)∥∥∥
delivering
ν
2
>
∥∥∥(1− δˆ)ui(p¯i(j),t) + δt+1t ((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(j), δt+1t ) + pνV¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
− V t,dti (f, {dt}t)
∥∥∥ , (8)
and
ν
2
>
∥∥∥∥(1− δˆ) maxai∈Ai ui(ai, p¯i(j),t−i ) + δt+1t ((1− pν)V¯ t+1i (p¯i(i), δt+1t ) + pνV¯ t+1i (a∗, δt+1t ))
−
(
(1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, p¯i
(j),t
−i )
+δt+1t
(
(1− ρ(t)t+1)V t+1,d
t+1
i (f, {dt}t) + ρ(t)t+1V t+1,d
t+1
i (a
∗, {dt}t)
))∥∥∥ , (9)
where V t+1,d
t+1
i (f, {dt}t) in condition 9, is the continuation payoff of player i’s punish-
ment path in the stochastic game when δt+2t+1 ∈ Ω ν(t+1) (otherwise, player i’s deviation
is followed by the repetitions of the Nash action).
Conditions 5, and conditions 8 and 9 together imply that
V t,d
t
i (f, {dt}t)−
(
(1− δˆ) max
ai∈Ai
ui(ai, p¯i
(j),t
−i )
+δt+1t
(
(1− ρ(t)t+1)V t+1,d
t+1
i (f, {dt}t) + ρ(t)t+1V t+1,d
t+1
i (a
∗, {dt}t)
))
> ν − ν
2
− ν
2
= 0,
showing that f is Nash in every subgame that starts with h such that δs+1s ∈ Ω ν(s) for
all s ≤ t with `(h) = t.
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Thus, f is subgame perfect.
Choose d0 = δˆ > δν such that δˆ ∈ Ω ν(1). Then, conditions 4, and 6 and 7 imply∥∥∥∥∥V 0,d0i (f, {dt}t)− (1− δˆ)
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
) (
ui
(
p¯it(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν2 ,
and ∥∥∥∥∥(1− δˆ)
∞∑
t=0
E0
(
δt0
) (
ui
(
p¯it(f¯)
))− (1− δˆ) ∞∑
t=0
δˆt
(
ui
(
p¯it(f¯)
))∥∥∥∥∥ < ν6 .
These, in turn, finishes the proof because of the following conclusion∥∥∥U (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥V 0,d0i (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ < 46ν < ν < η.
Now, we are ready to present the proof of our subgame perfect Folk Theorem for
repeated games with stochastic discounting:
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof of the Folk Theorem of Fudenberg and Maskin
(1991) shows that for any u ∈ U0, there exists some δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) and a strictly enforceable
simple strategy f¯ in G¯(δ¯) such that for all δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), U¯(f¯ , δ) = u.
This follows from considering conditions 2 – 4 and 8 in their proof, which guar-
antee that each phase of play (which they denote A for the equilibrium, Bj for the
minmax and Cj for the reward phases of j ∈ N) they consider satisfies incentive con-
ditions strictly. Additionally, because that each phase of play involves play consisting
of cycles, their strategy becomes simple and strictly enforceable when attention is re-
stricted to obtaining individually rational payoffs constructed with the pure strategy
minmax.
Hence, Lemma 4 applies and delivers the conclusion that for all η > 0 there exists
δ∗ ∈ (δ¯, 1) such that for all δˆ > δ∗ there is f in G({dt}t) with d0 = δˆ, such that f is
subgame perfect in G({dt}t) and
∥∥∥U (f, {dt}t)− U¯ (f¯ , δˆ)∥∥∥ < η. Thus, letting η ≤ ε,
renders the desired conclusion.
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